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Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village
School Dist.-When Neutrality Masks Hostility-The
Exclusion of Religious Communities From an
Entitlement to Public Schools
Our religion-clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled
(so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that
are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our
long-accepted constitutional traditions. Foremost among
these has been the so-called Lemon test ....
I. INTRODUCTION
Government attempts to accommodate, acknowledge, and
support religion are an accepted and valued part of our political
and cultural heritage. Sensitive to this heritage, the Supreme
Court has attempted to enforce the proscription of the Establish-
ment Clause2 by requiring government neutrality between religion
and "irreligion." Yet the Supreme Court has long struggled with
the vexatious problem of developing workable standards to apply
to Establishment Clause challenges. Consequently, the Court has
continuously re-examined the relationship between church and
state over the past two decades.
While currently applicable standards' initially provided some
guidance and assistance, the Court has gradually begun to distance
itself from such a neutrality-driven approach.4 Competing for ac-
ceptance appears to be at least one approach which returns to the
more limited scope of the original understanding of the Establish-
1 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The religion clauses of the First Amendment provide that
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof." Id.
3 The currently applicable standards were articulated by the Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzan, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra Part IV-B.
4 The Court declined to apply the Lemon test in at least two cases, see Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), and most re-
cently, in Lee, gave it only nominal recognition at best.
Difficulties with the Lemon test stem largely from the fact that it is no more
grounded in the historical underpinnings of the First Amendment, than is the "wall"
theory upon which it is based. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also infra Part IV-A.
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ment Clause: that "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires
government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion,
nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursu-
ing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian
means."
5
Recently, in Grumet v. Board of Education of the Kiyas Joel Village
School District,6 the Third Department of the New York Appellate
Division illustrated the inadequacy and need for abandonment of
the current approach. In Grumet, state legislation creating a public
school for a municipality comprised almost entirely, of members of
an ultraorthodox Hasidic sect was challenged as a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its New York
State counterpart, article XI, section 3 of the New York Constitu-
tion . 7
Following a judgment of a New York supreme court,' which,
inter alia, granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
declared the legislation facially unconstitutional, the appellate divi-
sion affirmed the lower court's order.9 If left unreversed by *the
New York Court of Appeals to which it is currently under consid-
eration, Grumet may very well serve to perpetuate what the lower
courts failed to recognize: that we are still a religious people, that
5 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Lee 112 S. Ct. at 2683
(Scalia, Rehnquist, White, Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
6 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
7 N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. This section provides:
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its credit or any public
money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institu-
tion of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any reli-
gious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught,
but the legislature may provide for the transportation of children to and from
any school or institution of learning.
Id.
Because the Unites States Constitution is clearly more restrictive than article XI, §
3, of the New York Constitution, the state constitutional provision will not be addressed
in this Note. Moreover, it seems clear that because the District would not be under the
direct control of any "religious denomination," nor would any "religious denominational
tenet or doctrine" be taught therein, that Chapter 748 raises no state constitutional is-
sues. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the nature of federal
and state constitutional limitations, see 10 THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE
CONSTITrTIONAL CONVENTION, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS (1967).
8 Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.), affd sub
nom Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
9 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
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we are capable of separating government from religion, and that
all levels of government must never be blind to the religious na-
ture of their citizens. For even current standards, when applied
with proper sensitivity to our traditions and case law, irrefutably
support the conclusion that accommodating the provision of pub-
lic benefits to the unique cultural and religious needs of a com-
munity is permissible, if not required.
Grumet does not present an opportunity for especially new or
novel legal analysis. However, in light, of the current state of flux
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Grumet's unique and com-
plex factual scenario may very well prove to be both an exception-
al challenge and opportunity for clarification for the New York
Court of Appeals, and quite possibly the United States Supreme
Court. Therefore, regardless of which side's argument the New
York Court of Appeals ultimately accepts, Grumet will likely indicate
the future direction that Establishment Clause jurisprudence will
take within New York and the nation as a whole.
This Note, therefore, will focus on the constitutional issues
raised by the application of current Establishment Clause standards
to state legislation, where the state legislation creates a public
school district for a municipality populated almost entirely by
members of the same religion and attempts to permissibly accom-
modate their unique culture and lifestyle. Part II of this Note will
set the factual and procedural stage for the discussion. Part III
reviews the facts and holding of the Grumet decision. Part IV brief-
ly reviews the foundational underpinnings of both .Establishment
Clause analysis and the Lemon test.10 It then suggests that the ap-
pellate division misapplied the three-pronged Lemon test, illustrat-
ing how the murky neutrality-based approach produces both
ahistorical and inconsistent results. Part V briefly examines possible
alternative approaches to Establishment Clause analysis in light of
the recent shift away from Lemon in the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. Part VI concludes that while the
legislation withstands a facial challenge under the Lemon test, such
neutrality tests should be abandoned. It then urges the New York
Court of Appeals to reverse the decision of the appellate division
and reaffirm the time honored principles of religious tolerance
and accommodation, by recognizing the central role that religion
plays in our society.
10 See infra Part IV-B.
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview
The Village of Kiryas Joel ("the Village"), located in Monroe,
New York, is one of four communities within New York" whose
inhabitants are members of the Satmar,12 an ultraorthodox Ha-
sidic"8 sect. The Village is of relatively recent origin. In 1974 the
Satmar first began their exodus from the Williamsburg section of
Brooklyn, New York to the town of Monroe in Orange County,
where they desired to establish a community in which they could
raise their families and preserve their religious and cultural life-
style. 4 As a result of what has been termed a "bitter contest" and
arduous opposition by the Satmar to Monroe's zoning and build-
11 The Satmar have three additional communities in the state of New York. These
include the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, Brooklyn's Borough Park section, and a
community in Monsey, Rockland County. See WILLIAM M. KEPHART & WLLIAM W.
ZELLNER, EXTRAORDINARY GROUPS 161 (1991).
12 The Satmar are one of the many rabbinical sects of the Jewish Hasidic movement
that rose in eastern and central Europe during the eighteenth century. Id. For a com-
plete treatment of the history of the Satmar Hasidic sect, see ISRAEL RuBN, SATMARu AN
ISLAND IN THE CITY (1972); see also Lis HARRIS, HOLY DAYS: THE WORLD OF A HASIDIC
FAMILY (1985); KEPHART & ZELLNER, supra note 11.
13 The term "Hasidim" means "pious ones." Hasidim, including the Satmar, strictly
follow the teachings of the Torah, which refers to "the Five Books that God is believed
to have composed even before He created the world, and then revealed to Moses at
Sinai." RuBN, supra note 12, at 46-48. Hasidim are distinctive in their dress and appear-
ance. For example, males wear long side curls, head coverings, and special garments.
Pursuant to their religious beliefs, the Satmar observe strict separation from the rest of
society. See also Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 527
N.E.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. 1988).
14 In fact, resistance to pressures of assimilation engendered by the surrounding
sociocultural system served as the chief rationale for the Satmar effort to maintain a
separate community. See generally HARRIS, supra note 12, at 54; KEPHART & ZELLNER, supra
note 11, at 165. The "barriers" that they erect, symbolic or otherwise, are not created in
an expression of hostility. Rather, they are the result of a religious belief system that gov-
erns even the most minute acts of everyday life and allows very little room for compro-
mise with regard to the central tenets. These "barriers" are designed to safeguard the
Village's identity and to assure that the observance of the Torah's commandments is pro-
tected from erosion. Joseph Berger, Hasidim Confnmt The Secular While Living A Life Apart,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1987, § 1, at 29. Thus, prevention of undesirable "acculturation" is
also among the chief reasons for having their own school system, thereby protecting their
children from exposure to a culture, lifestyle, and belief system that directly clashes with
that of the Satmar. See generally Margot Hornblower, Cultures Clash As Hasidic Jews Compete
For Turf, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1986, at Al; Elizabeth Kolbert, For Hasidic VIdlage, Uneasy
Times, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1986, at BI; Philip Lentz, Female Bus Drivers, Orthodox Jews Ride
To Unorthodox Clash, CHI. TRiB., Sept. 25, 1986, at 20; Gary Rosenberger, In Quiet New
Yor* Village, Unusual Jewish Sect Embraces Past, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A35.
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ing codes, the Satmar petitioned the Town in 1976 to establish
their existing community as an incorporated village to be known
as Kiryas Joel." That petition was granted, and in February, 1977,
the Village's residents approved the resultant incorporation propo-
sition.
The Village has grown to become a religious enclave for ap-
proximately 8000 Satmar. 6 By separating themselves from the
contiguous community (which was accomplished by founding and
incorporating the Village), the Satmar promote and further their
own religious beliefs, ideologies, and culture, while simultaneously
avoiding undesired "acculturation."17 No one has seriously chal-
lenged that the social and cultural components of the Satmar
Hasidim are markedly different from the outside community.
As the New York Court of Appeals detailed in Board of Educa-
tion of the Monroe-Woodbuwy Central School District v. Wieder,8
[a]part from separation from the outside7 community, separa-
tion of the sexes is observed within the Village. Yiddish is the
principal language of Kiryas Joel; television, radio and English
language publications are not in general use. The dress and
appearance of the Hasidim are distinctive-the boys, for exam-
ple, wear long side curls, head coverings and special garments,
and both males and females follow a prescribed dress code.
Education is also different: Satmarer children generally do not
attend public schools, but attend their own religiously affiliated
schools within Kiryas Joel. Boys are enrolled in the United
Talmudic Academy (UTA) and the girls in Bais Rochel, a UTA
affiliate. With an apparent over-all goal that children should
continue to live by the religious standards of their parents,
"Satmarer want [the UTA] to serve primarily as a bastion
against undesirable acculturation, as a training ground for
Torah knowledge in the case of boys, and, in the case of girls,
as a place to gather knowledge they will need as adult wom-
en."
19
15 In re Formation of a New Village to be Known as "Kiryas Joel" (Monroe Town
Supervisor, N.Y., Dec. 10, 1976) (decision on the sufficiency of a petition to incorporate
as a village).
16 See Rosenberger, supra note 14.
17 See supra notes 13-14 and accomparying text.
18 527 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1988).
19 Wwder, 527 N.E.2d at 769 (quoting RUBIN, supra note 12, at 140). The court fur-
ther noted that the Satmar made no reference to their religious beliefs or practices in
their submissions, rather only to their lifestyle and environment. Id. at 769 n.2. There-
fore, the majority concluded that it would be improper to entertain any potential free
exercise arguments because they had not been raised in the court below. The propriety
1993]
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B. Prior Related Litigation
The Satmar's adherence to their ultraorthodox religious be-
liefs and cultural practices has in recent years been at the center
of multiple lawsuits,' one of which eventually led directly to the
passage of Chapter 748 of the Laws of 198921 ("Chapter 748")
and the instant appeal. In that case, Board of Education of the'Mon-
roe-Woodbury Central School District v. Wieder,22  the Monroe-
Woodbury Central School District ("Monroe-Woodbury") brought
suit seeking a judgments declaring that it could not legally pro-
vide special education and related -services 'to the handicapped
students residing in the Village at any location other than within
Monroe-Woodbury's own public school buildings.24 The defen-
dants in that suit, who were the parents of the students involved,
asserted that the special education needs of their handicapped
children should be provided by Monroe-Woodbury on the premis-
es of the school which their children would have attended for
regular instruction, their religiously affiliated private school.' The
of such an argument is beyond the scope of this discussion and will not be addressed.
20 See, e.g., Bollenbach v. Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist.,
659 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that Monroe-Woodbury's provision of male
only bus drivers for the transportation of male Satmar students, in accordance with the
Satmar's religious tenet of separation of the sexes, had the primary effect of advancing
their religious beliefs); Board of Educ..of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that Monroe-Woodbury was not required to
provide special education services to handicapped Satmar children only within its public
schools and could constitutionally provide such services at a neutral site apart from the
sectarian schools within Kiryas Joel, but could not be compelled to do so). For another
case involving Satmar litigation relating'to the provision of special education services, but
unrelated to the Kiryas Joel Satmar litigation, see Parent's Ass'n of Pub. Sch. 16 v.
Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235 (2d Cir. 1986) (striking down the construction of a partition
within the public school building to separate Hasidic children from the general student
population).
21 See infra Part III-A.
22 527 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1988).
23 See N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3602 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1993).
24 This suit was precipitated by Monroe-Woodbury's termination of special education
services at a "neutral site," consisting of an annex to the Bais Rochel school, in response
to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
and Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 371 (1985). In these cases, the Court held that pub-
lic school teachers could not constitutionally provide educational services to school chil-
dren on the premises of private, sectarian schools. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414; Grand Rapids,
473 U.S. at 391. Monroe-Woodbury concluded that the Supreme Court's decisions man-
dated that the special education services be provided to the Kiryas Joel handicapped
children only at its public schools. Wteder, 527 N.E.2d at 770. After several months of
attendance at the public school programs, the defendant parents refused to permit their
children to continue. Id.
25 This school was the United Talmudic Academy ('UTA") for boys and Bals
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parents maintained that the delivery of special education services
at the site of the student's normal educational instruction was es-
sential because of "the panic, fear and trauma [the students] suf-
fered in leaving their own communities and being with people
whose ways were so different from theirs."
26
The New York Court of Appeals held in Wieder that New York
Education Law section 8602-c(9) did not require Monroe-
Woodbury to provide special education services to the defendants' .
children only within Monroe-Woodbury's regular classes and pro-
grams.' However, the court went on to hold that while Monroe-
Woodbury was not statutorily restricted to limiting its rendition of
special education services to its own school buildings, it did not
follow that the defendants' children therefore were entitled to
receive instruction within their own religious schools or even at a
neutral site within the Village.2" The court explicitly stated that
"the defendant's [sic] statutory entitlement to special services does
not carry with it a constitutional right to dictate where they must
be offered."' Unfortunately, the dispute was not resolved because
Monroe-Woodbury continued to offer the services only at its pub-
lic schools.' It was in the wake of the Wieder decision, and as a
result of the Satmar's political efforts to which they directed their
energy, that Chapter 748 was enacted into law. Chapter 748 creat-
ed the Kiryas Joel Village School District ("the District") which
could now provide the handicapped children in Kiryas Joel with
the necessary auxiliary services at a neutral site within the Village
and yet apart from the UTA or its affiliates. It was viewed by many
as a practical solution to what had become a protracted problem.
Rochel, a UTA affiliate, for girls. Wede, 527 N.E.2d at 770.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 773-74. Monroe-Woodbury was "neither compelled to make services available
to private school handicapped children only in regular public school classes and pro-
grams, nor without authority to provide otherwise." Id. at 774.
28 Id. at 775.
29 Id. at 774-75.
30 As a result, most of the parents of handicapped children in Kiryas Joel refused to
enroll their children in the Monroe-Woodbury public school system, where the special
education services continued -to be offered. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 128, 128 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
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III. THE APPELLATE DMSION's GRUMET DECISION
A. Factual Background
Through Chapter 748," the New York State Legislature cre-
ated the Kiryas Joel Village School District and granted its trustees
the powers and duties of union free school districts.3 2 Governor
Mario Cuomo noted in his approval memorandum'3 that the leg-
31 1989 N.Y. LAWS 748. Chapter 748 reads as follows:
An Act to establish a separate school district in and for the village of
Kiryas Joel, Orange County,
The People of the State of New York, represexited in Senate and Assembly,
do enact as follows:
Section 1. The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of Mon-
roe, Orange County, on the date when this act shall take effect, shall be and
hereby is constituted a separate school district, and shall be known as the Kiryas
Joel Village, School District and shall have and enjoy all the powers and duties
of a union free school district under the provisions of the education law.
Section 2. Such district shall be under the control of a board of education,
which shall be composed of from five to nine members elected by the qualified
voters of the Village of Kiryas Joel, said members to serve for terms not exceed-
ing five years.
Section 3. This act shall take effect on the first day of July next succeeding
the date when it shall have become law.
Id.
32 The creation of a new school district by special act of the legislature is one of
several ways in which such a district may be created. Historically, the New York State
Legislature has utilized this power specifically for the purpose of creating a public school
to service handicapped and other children with special needs.
Currently, union free school districts are established pursuant to the provisions of
sections 1522 and 1523 of the New York Education Law (through a petition for request
to establish a district, public notice of meeting, public meetings, etc.). See N.Y. EDUC.
LAw §§ 1522, 1523 (McKinney 1981). The New York Legislature has previously established
16 so-called "special act union free school districts" to provide educational services to
handicapped pupils and persons in need of supervision. These districts have not typically
had their own local real property tax base, taxation powers, or their own local school
population. Rather, most of the pupils at such schools usually are placed there by other
local school districts, social services, or Family Court. A. REP. No. 8747, 1989 Sess. 2
(1989) (budget recommendation on Chapter 748). However, nothing precludes them
from doing so, and in fact, the legislature has created at .least one such district in Wayne
County.
33 The Governor stated in this memorandum that the bill "is regarded by opponents
and proponents alike as a practical solution to what has been, so far, an intractable
problem." In approving the bill he went on to conclude:
I believe that this bill is a good faith effort to solve this unique problem. And
as noted above, I am advised that it is facially constitutional. Of course the new
school district must take pains to avoid conduct that violates the separation of
church and state because then a constitutional problem would arise in the appli-
cation of this law. The village officials acknowledge this responsibility. I believe
they will be true to their commitment.
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islation constituted an effort to resolve the longstanding conflict
between Monroe-Woodbury 'and the Village with respect to the
provision of special education services to handicapped students
residing within the Village. The bill finds its genesis in the years
of litigation surrounding Monroe-Woodbury's attempts to accom-
modate the undisputed needs of the Village's handicapped chil-
dren.ml
The District, whose boundaries are coterminous with those of
the Village, constitutes a unique and wholly secular presence with-
in the Village. As is made clear in the affidavits submitted during
discovery, the District school building 5 is physically separate and
apart from the religious schools within the community."6 It is
wholly secular in appearance and lacks even the customary sectari-
an symbols on the building, walls, and classrooms.37 State certi-
fied teachers, who are assisted by non-instructional personnel se-
lected in accordance with applicable civil service rules and regula-
tions,' staff the school which follows a secular academic calen-
dar. 9 While strict separation of the male and female students is
practiced within the surrounding community and religious schools,
boys and girls are instructed jointly at the District school.4 More-
over, the curriculum is secular and is not influenced or directed
by the sex of the student as occurs in the religious schools within
the Village.4' In addition, female teachers instruct male stu-
dents,42 which also would not occur in the religious schools. Fi-
nally, English is the primary language of instruction, although the
GOVERNOR'S MEM., 1989 MCKINNEYS SESSION LAWS OF N.Y., at 2430.
34 See Bollenbach v. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 659 F.
Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v.
Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1988).
85 At present, the District has only one school building. See generaly Sarah Lyall, Ha-
sidic Public School District Is Unconstitutional Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at B6.
86 Affidavit of Philip Paterno for Defendant Monroe-Woodbury at 1 6-18, June 18,
1991, Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.) (No. 1054-
90), affid sub no=. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592
N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992) [hereinafter Affidavit].
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 This is especially notable because the Village had previously litigated the related,
but certainly less significant, issue of the provision of female bus -drivers for its male
sectarian school children. See Bollenbach v. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent.
Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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school also offers bilingual and bicultural secular education pro-
grams.' This too is in marked contrast to the surrounding com-
munity, where Yiddish is the primary language of communication
and instruction.
The District currently educates approximately 140 handi-
capped students of both sexes." Moreover, like all other public
school districts, it provides secular textbooks,' health and welfare
services,' dual enrollment services, 47 and transportation to and
from school to resident students attending various nonpublic
schools.48
B. Analysis of the Appellate Division Decision
In January, 1990, Louis Grumet, Albert Hawk, and the New
York State School Boards Association ("NYSSBA") 49 brought suit
in a New York supreme court,5" alleging that Chapter 748 con-
stituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion in violation
of both the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and its
New York counterpart, article XI, section 3.5 In a cursory opin-
ion with little discussion of the actual merits, Judge Kahn granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgement and declared that Chap-
ter 748 represented an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion. He concluded that it violated all three prongs of the oft
utilized Lemon test, which requires that legislation have: a secular
43 Affidavit, supra note 36.
44 See generally School District For Hasidim Is Ruled ///e~ga N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1993, at
BS.
45 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1993).
46 Id. § 912 (McKinney 1981).
47 Id. § 3602 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1993).
48 Id. § 3635.
49 The two individual plaintiffs, Louis Grumet and Albert Hawk, were originally
named as party plaintiffs individually, as well as in their capacity as officers of NYSSBA.
However, the appellate division concluded that in their individual capacities, each satisfied
the requirements of citizen-taxpayer standing under § 123-a of the New York Finance
Law, but they failed to meet the requirements of standing in their capacities as represen-
tatives of N'ISSBA. Accordingly, NYSSBA lacked standing in its own right to maintain this
action. However, both Grumet and Hawk were held clearly to have standing to maintain
an action for injunctive relief to prevent the allegedly unconstitutional disbursement of
state funds. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. "Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d
123, 125-26 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
50 Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct. 1992), aff'd
sub norn. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
51 Id.; see supra note 7 for a discussion of the constitutional provisions.
52 Grumet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
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legislative purpose, that its principal or primary effect be one
which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and that it not foster
an excessive government entanglement with religion."3 Defen-
dants appealed this decision.'
The Third Department of the New York Appellate Division
was no more receptive to the Village's arguments. The Village
urged the court to reconsider its decision in light of the recent
Supreme Court decision in Lee v. Weisman:5 and, the seeming
trend away from the application of the Lemon test in the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The court declined
this invitation, however. Instead it too applied the Lemon test,
yielding similari if not identical, results. Those results will be ad-
dressed in turn.
1. Secular Purpose
Applying the first prong of the Lemon test,56 the appellate
division found that Chapter 748 lacked a secular purpose for two
reasons. First, the court noted that the handicapped children of
the Village were already entitled to receive special education ser-
vices pursuant to both state and federal law.57 Second, the court
noted that these services were already available to the Village chil-
dren from the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District, within
53 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also infra Part IV-B.
54 See Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d
123 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
55 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (striking down the recitation of invocations and benedic-
tions at public high school graduations). This decision has been described as "forming
the foundation for some future multicultural and humanist Constitution, draw[ing] little
upon the thinking of those who drafted our present Constitution." The Borked Court,
NAT'L REv., July 20, 1992, at 12. The Court avoided the important question of permissi-
ble government accommodation and involvement with religion. It also refused to recon-
sider the vitality and usefulness of the Lemon test, but then distanced itself from the test
by giving it only nominal application.
If anything, Lee represents a slight shift towards the more historically accurate con-
ception of the Establishment Clause, focusing on whether there has been government
coercion of religious belief, practice, or Support. Yet the dissenters were obviously unper-
suaded by the majority's conclusion, because for them the historically accurate construc-
tion of the Establishment Clause requires "coercion of religious orthodoxy and of finan-
cial support by force of law and threat of penalty." Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia,
Rehnquist, White, Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Thus, while the neutrality-based approach of
the Lemon test is losing its vitality, the original understanding view has as of yet been
unable to garner majority support.
56 See infra Part IV-B.
57 Grume, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 127; see 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4401
(McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1993).
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which the Village was located at the time.' The court concluded
that one of the contributing factors to the New York Legislature's
action, therefore, was not just the provision of educational ser-
vices, but also the accommodation of the unique lifestyle of the
Village residents. The court thus found no secular "need" for the
statute, thereby rendering it in violation of the first prong of the
Lemon test.59
2. Primary Effect
The appellate division next examined the second prong of
Lemon, whether Chapter 748 had the primary effect of advancing
religion.' Allegedly examining the entire context surrounding
the District's creation, the court held that "the statute not only
authorizes a religious community to dictate where secular public
educational services shall be provided to children of the communi-
ty, it creates the type of symbolic impact that is impermissible
under the second prong of the Lemon test."61 The fact that the
school was located at a wholly neutral site within the Village and
58 Grume4 592 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
59 Id.
60 See infra Part IV-B.
61 Grumet, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 127. The court seemingly suggests that because the com-
position of the Board of Education will likely consist of Satmar Hasidim, it will be under
de facto religious control. This is not the case, however. The District is not a sectarian
school. It does not teach or promote any religious tenets or doctrines and is also not
under the control or direction of any religious denomination.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that the Constitution does not
prohibit individuals of faith from holding public office. It is only when governmental
power is given directly to a religious institution that a constitutional problem arises. See
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982) (striking down Massachusetts statute
vesting governing bodies of churches with governmental veto power relative to issuance of
liquor licenses); cf. McDaniel v. Patty, 435 U.S. 618, 627 (1978) (striking down provision
of Tennessee Constitution disqualifying ministers from serving in capacity of constitutional
delegate).
The issue in Grendel's Den was not that religious leaders were exercising governmen-
tal power. Rather, it was that they were exercising that power in a capacity in which they
were not required to be constitutionally neutral, because they were acting as members of
a church rather than as public officials. In contrast, Reverend McDaniel was acting as a
public official and was accountable to his constituents and the Constitution rather than
just his church. The decision in McDanie4 therefore, puts a limit on the scope of
Grendel's Den.
This all suggests that any dual role that the residents of Kiryas Joel may play would
not constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause, for they would fall within the
scope of McDaniel rather than within Grendel's Den. Board members would not be acting
as religious leaders, but rather as public school officials, and as such would be account-
able first and foremost to the laws of the state of New York.
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would offer only secular services provided by state certified teach-
ers was deemed irrelevant given that such services would be pro-
vided to a community comprised almost entirely of the adherents
of orie religion.62  The court concluded that because the
recipient's deeply held religious beliefs permeated their lifestyle,
the state could not constitutionally provide them with these servic-
es within the confines of the Village itself without their rendition
being "perceived by adherents of the Satmarer Hasidim as an
endorsement, and by nonadherents as a disapproval, of their indi-
vidual religious beliefs.' ° The court declined to examine the
third prong of the Lemon test" given its conclusions from the
first two prongs.6
IV. THE APPELLATE DivISION's FLAWED ANALYSIS OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE LEMON TEST
A. Background
The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof." Although this provision was pri-
marily intended as a check on the authority of the federal govern-
ment, it has been made applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment6 7
The drafters of the Establishment Clause feared a union of
church and state at the federal level because they believed that
government-sponsored religion resulted in "hatred, disrespect and
even contempt of those who [hold] contrary beliefs.' s James
Madison' described the primary role of the Establishment and
62 Grune4 592 N.Y.S.2d at 128.
63 Id.
64 See infra Part V-B.
65 GrumeA 592 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30.
66 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
67 Writing for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940),
Justice Roberts explained that "[tQhe First Amendment declares that Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws." Id. at 303; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943).
68 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
69 James Madison wrote his eloquent Memorial and Remonstrance against govern-
ment sponsorship of religion. See MADISON'S MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELI-
GIOUS ASSESSMENTS, reprinted in the Appendix to Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissenting opin-
ion in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947).
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Free Exercise Clauses to be to prevent, as far as possible, the in-
trusion of either the church or the state into the other's domain.
As described by Thomas Jefferson, the clause was intended to
erect a "wall of separation between Church and State."7 Justifica-
tion for this requirement of separation rests upon the premise
that "both religion and government can best work to achieve their
lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere."71
In applying these principles to church-state interaction, the
Supreme Court has recognized that absolute, total separation is
not possible and that such interaction is more probably inevita-
ble.72 Yet, as the Court has consistently commented regarding the
relationship between man and religion, "the State is firmly com-
mitted to a position of neutrality."3 To maintain this neutral
role, the state need not be hostile towards religion, but rather is
encouraged to assume a posture of neutral accommodation. 74 In
70 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 219-20 (1963) (noting that the separation between Church and
State must be complete and unequivocal); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)
("First Amendment reflects philosophy that Church and State should be separated");
McCollum v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 33 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (noting that
the wall between Church and State must be kept high).
However, while the Court has recognized that some separation between Church and
State is required, it has also concluded that the "wall," rather than being impenetrable, is
instead a permeable barrier. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-07 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing "wall of separation" metaphor as both lacking his-
torical foundation and useless in guiding the Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976) ("[A] hermetic
separation of the two is an impossibility [the Establishment Clause] has never required.");
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) ("[T]he line of separation, far from being
a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable harrier."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
445-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (The Court is not "responsibly aided by the uncrit-
ical invocation of metaphors like the 'wall of separation,' a phrase nowhere to be found
in the Constitution."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) ("[T]he First Amend-
ment . . . does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of
Church and State."); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 213-15 (1982) (arguing that rigid separation was not contem-
plated by the framers of the Constitution and therefore such separation is an erroneous
judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause).
Thus, the Everson "wall" illustrates the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's observation
that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. R. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(N.Y. 1926).
71 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
72 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
73 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55; see also Roene-, 426 U.S. at 747 ("[C]ourt has enforced
scrupulous neutrality by the state.").
74 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our
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assuming this posture, however, the state must be careful not to
accommodate to the point where. it lends direct support to a par-
ticular religion.75 This, in essence, is the inherent tension in Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence and is the linchpin of the con-
flict over Chapter 748 and the Village District.
B. The Lemon Test
Currently, any analysis of the constitutionality of Chapter 748
must have its origin in the principles articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 6 While the so-called three-pronged
or tri-partite test may well be less relevant in light of recent Su-
preme Court decisions such as Lee v. Weisman,77 until such time
as the Court clearly articulates different governing principles, any
analysis of an Establishment Clause challenge must at least begin
with the Lemon test.
In Lemon, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional
a Pennsylvania statute that, among other things, provided state
financial aid directly to church-related schools, including salary
reimbursement for the secular component of teacher's salairies,
textbooks, and instructional materials. The Court explained the
nature of the Establishment Clause and set out the test as follows:
democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine,
and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion.").
75 In distinguishing government accommodation of religion from government estab-
lishment of religion, one commentator has stated:
Accommodations of religion are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not for the purpose of promoting the government's own
favored form of religion, but of allowing individuals and groups to exercise their
religion-whatever it may be-without hindrance ....
Accommodation must be distinguished from the establishment of religion,
which is government action designed to promote, channel, or direct religious
exercise in socially-preferred ways. The hallmark of accommodation is that the
individual or group decides for itself whether to engage in a religious practice,
or what practice to engage in, on grounds independent of the governmental ac-
tion. The government simply facilitates ("accommodates") the decision of the
individual or group; it does not induce or direct, by means of either incentive
or compulsion. The hallmark of establishment is that the government uses its
authority and resources to support one religion over another, or religion over
nonreligion. Much of the argument over accommodation is based on a failure to
perceive the fundamental difference between these two postures toward religion.
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critic,
60 GEo. WASH. L REv. 685, 688 (1992).
76 403 U.S. 602 (1972).
77 Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see supra note 55 and accompanying'
text.
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The language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment is at best opaque, particularly when compared with other
portions of the Amendment. Its authors did not simply prohibit
the establishment of a state church or a state religion, an area
history shows they regarded as very important and fraught with
great dangers. Instead they commanded that there should be
"no law respecting an establishment of religion." A law may be-
one "respecting" the forbidden objective while falling short of
its total realization. A law "respecting" the proscribed result,
that is, the establishment of religion, is not always easily identi-
fiable as one violative of the Clause. A given law might not
establish a state religion but nevertheless be one "respecting"
that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to such
establishment and hence offend the First Amendment.
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibi-
tions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involve-
ment of the sovereign in religious activity."
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration
of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
78
However, in Tilton v. Richardson,79 a companion case decided
on the same day that the Court articulated the Lemon test, the
Court qualified its application somewhat by noting "that there is
no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the
precise degree to which these three factors are present or ab-
sent."' Moreover, just four years later in Meek v. Pittenger," the
Court further clarified the Lemon test stating that it constituted a
convenient distillation of principles rather than establishing precise
limits and thus served "only as guidelines with which to identify
instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have
been impaired. " 12 Yet the Grumet court engaged in a rigid and
78 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
79 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding act authorizing construction grants to religiously
affiliated colleges).
80 Tifton, 403 U.S. at 677.
81 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down government program providing auxiliary ser-
vices on parochial school property).
82 Id. at 355; see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) ("[The three ele-
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often inaccurate application of these mere "signposts" and "guide-
lines" in striking down Chapter 748, thereby departing from the
tradition of accommodation of religion. The problems with such a
strict analysis will be addressed in turn.
C. Separating the Facial Constitutionality of the Statute from
Potential "As Applied" Violations
In Bowen v. Kendrick, 3 the Supreme Court specifically upheld
the authority of a court to distinguish, for First Amendment pur-
poses, between the facial constitutionality of a statute and the
particular manner in which 'uch statutes have been applied or
administered in practice.8" The Supreme Court noted:
There is, then, precedent in this area of constitutional law for
distinguishing between the validity of the statute on its face
and its validity in particular applications. Although the Court's
opinions have not even adverted to (to say nothing of explicitly
delineated) the consequences of this distinction between "on its
face" and "as applied" in this context, we think they do justi-
fy ... separating the two issues ....
The issue before the. Court in Bowen was whether the financ-
ing of grants to nonpublic groups, including religious and charita-
ble groups, violated the First Amendment by having the direct
effect of advancing religion. 6 The Court found the statute to be
constitutional on its face but remanded the action to determine
whether there had been any "as applied" violation.
8 7
In Grumet, Judge Kahn, and subsequently the appellate divi-
sion, failed to distinguish between these two separate and distinct
forms of constitutional challenge. By focusing on the religious
identity of the inhabitants of the Village rather than on the nature
of the legislation establishing the school, the court has blurred the
distinction between "facial" constitutionality and "as applied" viola-
ments of the Lemon test] are no more than helpful signposts.").
83 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
84 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 600-02. The Supreme Court has decided several cases involving
challenges to a statute "on its face." See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
(finding the Louisiana Creationism Act "facially invalid"). Other cases have been decided
without the benefit of a record as to how the challenged statute has been applied. See,
e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
85 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602.
86 Id- at 604-05.
87 Id. at 622.
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tions. The court below has held, in effect, that because the un-
derlying community consists almost exclusively of Satmar Hasidim,
any provision of municipal services to that area will necessarily be
tainted by religious influences. In other words, an "as-applied"
violation might result when Chapter 748 is implemented. The
Grumet court therefore concluded that Chapter 748 must necessari-
ly run afoul of the Establishment Clause because the possibility of
"as-applied" violations exists. However, there does not appear to be
any logical justification for developing such an inference. A statute
should not be invalidated on a facial challenge unless it can be
demonstrated that it can never be administered in a constitutional
manner.
s8
In fact, were the court to find, that there had actually been
some form of "as-applied" violation (of which there is no evidence
in the record),' the proper remedy would not be to strike down
the legislation as a whole, but rather would be to enjoin the un-
constitutional action running afoul of the Establishment Clause.'
The appropriate action by the court, if any, should be as Judge
Levine suggests in dissent: to reverse, declare the statute facially
valid, and remand for trial the disputed factual issues to deter-
mine whether Chapter 748 is valid as applied.9 This would "give
the Satmarer Hasidim their day in court to establish that the stat-
ute can be and has been implemented in a way that sufficiently
separates the Village District's children from their religious pre-
cepts and practices to avoid conflict with the Establishment
Clause. 2
D. Chapter 748 Has a Secular Legislative Purpose
As Judge Levine noted in his dissent in Grumet, Chapter 748
was enacted "to break the impasse between the members of the
Satmar Hasidic sect ... and the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District . . . over the public provision of special education services
for the handicapped children of the Village.' s Yet the majority
88 Id. at 612.
89 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text. These examples serve to illustrate
the significant disparity between the uniquely sectarian nature of the community itself
and the wholly secular nature of the District created by Chapter 748.
90 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621-22.
91 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123,
130 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992) (Levine, J., dissenting).
92 Id.
93 Id.
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concluded that because these services were already available
through Monroe-Woodbury, Chapter 748 therefore lacked any
secular "need," thereby violating the purpose prong of Lemon.'
However, the majority completely misunderstood the manner in
which the Supreme Court has traditionally applied the purpose
prong.
Often with very little discussion, the Court has seemingly ac-
cepted virtually any 'plausible secular purpose for legislation or
actions challenged under the. Establishment Clause,95 demonstrat-
ing the virtual meaninglessness of this requirement. In fact, only
when the Court determined that there was no question that a
- statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations
did it invalidate legislation for.lack of a secular purpose. 6 The
Court realized that "focus exclusively on the religious component
of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation."97 Were
94 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
95 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1988); Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 335-36 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
485-86 (1986); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985); Mueller v. Al-
len, 463 U.S. 388, 894-95 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1982);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 '(1981); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v.,Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654, 657 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gipus Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-80, n.7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
678-79 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
96 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 587, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring)
("A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The
religious purpose must predominate."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (find-
ing that the Alabama school prayer statute had entirely no secular purpose); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (finding "preeminent purpose" of state statute requiring
posting of Ten Commandments in each public school classroom to be "plainly religious
in nature," despite legislative recitations of "supposed secular purpose"); Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (state "anti-evolution" statute clearly religious in pur-
pose); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963) (striking down read-
ings from Bible, without comment or discussion, to begin school day in public schools as
having no secular purpose); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (striking down
recitation of prayer composed by governmental officials, as completely devoid of secular
purpose).
Of course, as Justice O'Connor notes in her concurrence to Wallace, "this secular
purpose must be 'sincere;' a law will not pass constitutional muster if the secular purpose
articulated by the legislature is merely a 'sham.'" Wallace 472 U.S. at 64. However, this is
of no concern in Grume, for the purpose of Chapter 748 is clearly sincere as indicated
by the record. See also Edwards, 482 ,U.S. at 586-87; Stone, 449 U.S. at 41; Schempp, 374
U.S. at 223-24.
97 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
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the test to require that the state have "exclusively secular" objec-
tives whenever it adopted legislation, there would be little, if any,
legislation or conduct approved by the Court in the past that
would have satisfied such an immense burden.98
Moreover, the Establishment Clause does not proscribe state
legislation merely because it coincides with the personal desires of
the individuals most directly affected or harmonizes with the ten-
ets of some or all religions.' In fact, such a proscription would
require "that the government show a callous indifference to reli-
gious groups,"' ° which the Court has never before demanded in
its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Rather, this first prong of
Lemon attempts to prevent the legislative abandonment of neutrali-
ty aimed at directly promoting religious activity.' Therefore, the
proper inquiry is whether the state legislature's actual purpose was
either to endorse or disapprove of religion."2
When evaluating this critical issue, the Court has repeatedly
affirmed its "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the
98 I& at 682 n.6; see also Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (concluding that Lemon does not
require that a law's purpose must be completely unrelated to religion); Wallac4 472 U.S.
at 56 ("[A] statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first
criterion [of the Lemon test].").
99 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (sustaining Sunday closing laws
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat more likely that
citizens would respect religious institutions and even attend religious services); see also
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602-04 (upholding AFIA grants to religious institutions even though
such funding aids their religious mission); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980).
100 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
101 Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
The most extensive discussion of the Establishment Clause's latitude can be found
in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947):
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or prac-
tice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secret-
ly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice ver-
sa.
Id- at 15-16.
102 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) ("Lemon's first prong focuses on
the purpose that animated adoption of the Act."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ('The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
governments actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.").
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States." 103 Moreover, the Court "presume[s] that legislatures act
in a constitutional manner.""' Therefore, so long as the record
suggests that those legislators who supported Chapter 748 acted
with a sincere secular purpose in mind, the Act must survive the
first prong of Lemon. This should be true regardless of whether
there were other means at their disposal to accomplish the same
or similar objectives." 5
The New York Legislature suggests as its intended purpose the
provision of "special education services to handicapped children
who were not receiving those services.""° While one of the fac-
tors contributing to the passage of Chapter 748 likely was the
accommodation of the Village resident's concerns, as is evident
from the discussion above, it would be a disingenuous stretch of
reality to suggest that the New York Legislature's exclusive purpose
was to endorse the religious beliefs of the Satmar Hasidim.107 It
is apparent that when placed in context, there is insufficient evi-
dence to establish that Chapter 748 was a purposeful or surrep-
103 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983); see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 618
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 699 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987); see alsb Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S.
957, 963 (1982); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981); McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
105 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.7; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-50
(1961).
106 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123,
126-27 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
107 This is especially true when Chapter 748 is viewed solely within its four comers.
As the Court has repeatedly affirmed in many contexts, inquiry into the motivation of
legislators is often an exercise in futility because it is difficult if not impossible to deter-
mine the "sole" or dominant motivation behind the choices of such a large group. See,
e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 631-35 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michael M. v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1980); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
283 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971).
See geneially Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions:" The Relative Reli-
ability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative Histmy, 1990 DUKE
LJ. 39; John Donovan, Note, Unconstitutional Motivation Analysis and the First Amendment:
The Further Demise of a "Wise and Ancient Doctrine," 33 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 271 (1983).
In fact, in his dissenting opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Jus-
tice Scalia advocated the abandonment of the purpose prong of the Lemon test- '[W]hile
it is possible to discern the objective 'purpose' of a statute ... , or even the formal
motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth ... ., discerning the subjective
motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible
task." Id. at 636. Therefore, inquiry into the legislative history of an act is unnecessary
unless it is ambiguous on its face. As Chapter 748 is not ambiguous, the court's analysis
of its secular purpose should be confined to the act's four corners.
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titious effort to express some kind of subtle-governmental advocacy
of the Hasidic faith. As the Supreme Court appropriately noted in
Everson, "It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to
facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education
serves no public purpose. "108 Chapter 748, therefore, clearly sur-
vives analysis under the first prong of Lemon.
E. Chapter 748 Has a Primary Effect Which Neither
Advances Nor Inhibits Religion
The Establishment Clause requires that legislation have more
than merely a secular purpose. "IT]he propriety of a legislature's
purposes may not immunize from further scrutiny a law which ...
has a primary effect that advances religion." 9 Accepting arguen-
do that Chapter 748 had a secular purpose, the Grumet majority
apparently struck down Chapter 748 for just this reason.
However, the appellate division again misunderstood the un-
derpinnings of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
For purposes of the second prong of Lemon, the crucial issue to
be determined is not whether some benefit accrues to religion as a
consequence of the legislation, but whether its principal or primary
effect advances religion."'
In determining whether a statute has the "primary effect" of
advancing religion, the Court has seemingly utilized a two-part
analysis, often in a haphazard and indeterminate manner. The
first element of this analysis considers whether the state has ad-
vanced religion by directly engaging in government-financed or
government-sponsored involvement in religious activity.' The
second element evaluates whether the challenged legislation or
conduct has created an impermissible symbolic link between gov-
ernment and religion." 2 Only if both elements have been satis-
108 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
109 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774
(1973).
110 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).
111 Se, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 611-12 (1988).
112 Impermissible advancement occurs when the government "fosters a close identifi-
cation of its powers and responsibilities with those of any--or all-religious denomina-
tions." Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985). "If this identification conveys a
message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion," then the Establishment
Clause has been violated. Id. Therefore, a symbolic link may be created if the challenged
legislation or conduct "is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the control-
ling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of
their individual religious choices." Id. at 390; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
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fled has the Court apparently been willing to uphold a challenged
statute.
1. Chapter 748 does not provide direct government support of
religion
The Court has identified two areas in which government
funds have been used to finance secular educational activities in a
sectarian context, each meeting differing results."' In the first
area, "the government has used primarily secular means to accom-
plish a primarily secular end, and no 'primary effect' has thus
been found." 114 Legislation which the Court has upheld under
this rationale includes reimbursement to parents of transportation
costs to parochial schools;' release time programs; 16 aid for
construction of secular classroom buildings at sectarian universi-
ties; 7  grants to non-public colleges;"' tax deductions to par-
ents for tuition, textbboks, and transportation;" 9 loans of text-
books and instructional materials to parochial school students; 2 °
and federal grants to non-public institutions providing counseling
services.21 Merely because the challenged legislation provided
688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In Grand Rapids, the Court, among other things, invalidated a program that allowed
public school teachers to provide instructional services to parochial schoolchildren in the
parochial schools. The Court found the program unconstitutional because allowing such
instruction "in the parochial schools" conveyed a message of support for religion to both
the children and the community. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 390-92.
Thus, the Court maintained the facade of neutrality. They found it permissible to
impose the neutrality standard upon the Grand Rapids School District because it resulted
in the mere denial of a public subsidy within one narrowly confined area-the private
school. The Court, in essence, permitted these religious individuals access to remedial
reading services, just not within the confines of a religiously affiliated school. Such sleight
of hand proves inadequate in GrumA, however. Rather than denying the Village a public
subsidy within one narrowly confined area, the appellate division has demanded that the
Satmar change their lives comprehensively if they desire public instruction within the Vil-
lage. Such alleged neutrality, therefore, becomes instead, latent hostility. See also infra Part
V-A.
113 Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 393.
114 Id.
115 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
116 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S." 306 (1952).
117 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973).
118 Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
119 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
120 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977).
121 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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some "remote," "incidental," or "indirect" benefit to religion, was
not considered enough to render it constitutionally infirm. 22
The proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits all legisla-
tive action which in some manner facilitates religion has consis-
tently been rejected by the Court. 2  As Justice White once not-
ed:
A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches
to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to
have forbidden "effects" under Lemon, it must be fair to say
that government itself has advanced religion through its own
activities and influence. As the Court observed in Walz, "for the
men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
the 'establishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in reli-
gious activity." 1
24
Thus, the Court has never indicated that legislation which
gives special consideration to religious groups is per se invalid.
Such a proposition would run contrary to the fundamental princi-
ple that there is considerable room for accommodation of religion
under the Establishment Clause. 25 Yet a rigid analysis such as
that undertaken by the appellate division leads to just such an
unacceptable result.
In the second area identified by the Court, "the government,
although acting for a secular purpose, has done so by directly
supporting a religious institution. "12' Accordingly, the Court has
struck down legislation which provided for religious instruction on
the premises of public schools during the school day,' salary
supplements for teachers of secular subjects in parochial
schools, 2 ' direct aid to parochial schools for maintenance and
repairs," 9 instructional equipment loans to parochial schools, 30
122 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393 (1985); see also Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747;
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1973).
123 See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
124 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (quoting Waks, 397 U.S. at 668).
125 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89-90 (1985); Wa!:, 397 U.S. at 669-70;
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 311 (1963).
126 Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 394.
127 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
128 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
129 Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
130 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); see also Wolman v. Waiter, 433 U.S. 229
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instruction of secular subjects by public school teachers on the
premises of sectarian schools,131 and leasing ofparochid school
classrooms to public school personnel for secular, instruction.' 2
The crucial determination in discerning between mere accommo-
dation (category 1) from support of religion (category 2), there-
fore, is whether the challenged legislation provides such direct
support to religion or merely ah incidental benefit similar to those
often upheld by the Court in the past.
Critical to reaching any conclusion to this question, has been
the Court's consideration of whether the beneficiary under the
challenged legislation could be characterized as being "pervasively
sectarian" in nature.'" In every case in which the Court has
struck down legislation involving educational programs, the chal-
lenged aid was given directly to a sectarian beneficiary.'-" These
beneficiaries consisted primarily of sectarian schools, in which
religion so permeated the provision of a secular education that
their religious and secular educational functions were in fact in-
separable.'35
This obviously has not occurred in Grumet, however. Rather,
Chapter 748 provides purely secular aid to a purely secular benefi-
ciary: a public school- within the validly incorporated Village of
Kiryas Joel. Thus, no sectarian beneficiary or school is involved at
all. Only if one were to consider the personal religious choices of
the individual taxpayers comprising the Village populous, could
the exceptionally tenuous argument be made that Chapter 748
provides direct aid or support to. a "religious institution." To make
such an argument, however, the Village must be considered a de
facto church, an argument which none of the litigants has made.
While religious considerations certainly prompted the initial con-
(1977).
131 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
132 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
133 In Grand Rapid, for example, the Court began its "effects" inquiry with "a consid-
eration of the nature of the institutions" receiving government aid. Id. at 384.
134 See, eg., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
135 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680 (1971). In discussing what constitutes a
"pervasively sectarian" beneficiary, the Court stated in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973), that "[a]id normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing reli-
gion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission." Id. at 743.
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gregation of Satmar within the Village, the fact remains that it is
just that, a validly incorporated municipality comprised of indi-
vidual landowners most of whom happen to be adherents of the
same religion. 6 Moreover, the Grumet majority specifically stated
that it.was not the location of the public school in a community
comprised of a religious populous that they found offensive to the
Establishment Clause. 7
Therefore, for purposes of this first element, Chapter 748 fits
squarely within the contours of a permissible accommodation of
religion. The New York Legislature has used primarily secular
means, creating a public school for a validly incorporated munici-
136 The United States District Court in Oregon found this fact to be of special signif-
icance. In Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Oregon 1984), the
district court struck down the incorporation of the city as having the primary effect of
advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1216-17.
The city's boundaries were contiguous with those of a religious commune, all of
whose real property was owned and controlled by a for-profit corporation, the Rajneesh
Investment Corporation ("RIC"). Id at 1210-11. The commune and corporation were
founded to advance the religious teachings of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and to estab-
lish a religious community where every aspect of life would be controlled by such teach-
ings. Id. However, because residency and all real property in and around the city were
controlled by the RIC, the district court concluded that the conferral of municipal status
upon such a religious community had the primary effect of advancing religion in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. Id at 1216-17.
The linchpin of the court's conclusion was that both real property and residency
were controlled by the RIC, a religious organization. As the court stated:
[C]ontrol over the City of Rajneeshpuram by these religious organizations
is different enough from the control exercised by the religious leaders in a city
of private landowners of one religion as to allow a constitutional distinction to
be made between the two situations.
Similarly, there is a difference between the effect on and benefit to reli-
gion of the provision of ordinary municipal services to a city of private landown-
ers of one religion and to the City of Rajneeshpuram, where the land is com-
munally owned and controlled by religious organizations. The provision of these
services by a municipal government in a city whose residents are private land-
owners of one religious faith has the direct and primary effect of aiding the
individual landowners and residents living in the city. The effect on the religion
of those private landowners is remote, indirect, and incidental.
I& at 1216.
The Village of Kiryas Joel can clearly be distinguished from the plight of the City
of Rajneeshpuram and its constitutional infirmities. Whereas all real property within the
Rajneeshpuram was owned and controlled by the RIC, all real property within the Village
is privately owned with no restraints upon alienation or residency. Thus, the Village is
not under the control of a religious organization as occurred in Rajneeshpuramn. Any bene-
fits or services (including the creation of a public school) provided to the Village, there-
fore, aid not the Hasidic religion, but the individual landowners and residents living
within the Village. Any effect on the Hasidic religion is indirect and incidental.
137 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123,
128 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
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pality; to achieve a primarily secular end, the provision of secular
instructional services to the Village's handicapped children. The
fact that Chapter 748 allows the children to remainiin a familiar
environment can be characterized only'as an "indirect" or "inci-
dental" benefit to religion at best. This conclusion becomes es-
pecially strong when it is noted how uniquely secular a presence
the school appears when contrasted with the unique culture and
lifestyle of the majority of the populous."s As expressed by the
Court in Wolman v. Walter,"3 9 providing educational -services, even
to exclusively parochial schoolchildren, will not have the imper-
missible effect of advancing religion if it is done in "truly religious-
ly neutral locations."1 4 The District provides these services in a
religiously neutral location that is physically and educationally
separate from the functions of both the UTA and the Village.141
Thus, Chapter 748 no more provides direct government support
of religion than do any of those programs previously upheld by
the Court.
2. Chapter 748 does not create an impermissible symbolic link
between government and religion
. The majority in Grumet did not conclude that Chapter 748
provided direct support of religion. Rather, it was the second
element, an alleged "symbolic link" between government and the
Hasidic faith upon which they based their holding and struck
down Chapter 748.142 As the court stated,
We emphasize that it is not the location of the public school
in the religious community and the provision of public educa-
tional services to sectarian students that we find offensive to
the Establishment Clause. The impermissible effect is the sym-
bolic impact of creating a new school district coterminous with'
a religious community to provide educational services that were
already available in an effort to resolve a dispute between the
religious community and the school district within which the
community, was formerly located, a dispute based upon the
language, lifestyle and environment of the community's chil-
138 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
139 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (allowing therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services, which'
were offered in mobile units to parochial school children).
140 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247-48.
141 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
142 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123,
128 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
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dren created by the religious tenets, practices and beliefs of the
community.1
The two, however, seem inextricably intertwined. How can
Chapter 748 create a symbolic link between government and the
Hasidic religion if the court does not consider the religious nature
of the Village populous?
The majority seemingly evaluated two distinct questions, an-
swering one in the affirmative and the other in the negative. The
first question considered was whether the mere existence of a public
school within the confines of a community comprised almost en-
tirely of the adherents of one religion was necessarily infirm as
creating a symbolic link between government and religion. While
the trial court focused primarily on this issue in striking down
Chapter 748,1" the appellate division apparently answered this
question in the negative. The majority failed to discuss this issue
other than to note that it allegedly was not the source of its hold-
ing 145
The appellate division next examined whether the legislative
action of creating a public school, in an attempt to accommodate
the desires of the residents of the Village, resulted in a similar
impermissible symbolic effect. The majority answered this question
in the affirmative."4 However, an affirmative response to either
interrogatory finds no support in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. Each interrogatory will be addressed in turn.
(a) The mere existence of a school within a religiously homogeneous
community does not create an impermissible symbolic link.-In striking
down Chapter 748, Judge Kahn determined that because the
District's boundaries are coterminous with those of the Village, an
impermissible symbolic link between government and religion
must always occur due to the religious nature of the populous.
4 7
However, even if one considers the personal religious choices of
the Village populous to warrant different constitutional treatment
143 Id. (citations omitted).
144 Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007 (Sup. Ct.), arf'd
sub non Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
145 Grumet, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30.
146 Id. at 128.
147 Grumet, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
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from that given to any other municipality,' neither sound logic
nor Supreme Court precedent support such a conclusion.
Even when considering the provision of instructional staff and
materials to classes composed exclusively of parochial schoolchil-
dren in parochial schdol buildings,"' the Court has consistently
stated that standing alone, the fact that remedial services are pro-
vided only to sectarian school students does not create a symbolic
link that impermissibly advances religion, so long as the services
are provided at a neutral site. 50 Only because the services of-
fered were provided within the parochial school buildings them-
selves have programs been struck down as having the impermissi-
ble symbolic effect of advancing religion.' 5'
For example, in Meek v. Pittenger,"5 2 the Court struck down
that portion of a Pennsylvania statute at issue which authorized
the provision of certain auxiliary services on nonpublic school
premises.' Similarly, in Grand Rapids v. Bal' 54 the Court in-
validated a program that allowed public school teachers to teach
certain courses in nonpublic schools.' However, the Court has
also recognized that so long as these types of services are offered
at religiously neutral locations, the danger perceived in Meek and
Grand Rapids does not arise.
It was for this reason that the Court upheld, in Wolman v.
Walter,"56 a state statute that provided therapeutic, guidance, and
remedial services to sectarian pupils in public schools, public cen-
ters, and mobile units located "off the premises of the nonpublic
148 See supra note 136.
149 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247 (1977) (danger that a public employee
might be unduly influenced by sectarian atmosphere "arose from the nature of the insti-
tution, not from the nature of the pupils").
150 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (upholding provision of auxiliary services
to parochial school students off the premises of the parochial schools).
151 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating program allowing public
school teachers to provide instruction within parochial school buildings); Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating program allowing public school teachers to
provide instruction on the premises of parochial schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975) (concluding that provision of auxiliary services on parochial school property
violated Establishment Clause); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (con-
cluding that provision of religious instruction within the public school classrooms caused
violation of Establishment Clause); see also supra note 112.
152 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
153 Id. at 371.
154 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
155 See also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
156 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977).
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schools." The Court found nothing impermissible in the provision
of such services to parochial school students separate and apart
from public school students so long as they were provided at sites
that were "'neither physically nor educationally identified with the
functions of the nonpublic school.'"1 17 Provision within such mo-
bile units was sufficient to satisfy the "neutral location" re-
quirement, and therefore, was not considered part of the "perva-
sively sectarian atmosphere of the church-related school."
158
Most recently, in Cavazos v. Pulido,5 9 the Eighth Circuit reaf-
firmed the principles announced in Wolman, and upheld the con-
stitutionality of a program providing Chapter 1 services to parochi-
al school students in mobile units parked on the property of, but
physically separated from, the parochial school buildings. The
court failed to see any risk of creating a symbolic link between
church and state or conveying a message of state support for reli-
gion "when the services are provided by nonparochial school
teachers in mobile and portable units that are separate and dis-
tinct from the parochial school classrooms and buildings. " "
Moreover, the court noted that the mobile units were owned,
operated, and controlled exclusively by the public school author-
ities, that they did not exhibit or contain any religious symbols,
that they were secular in appearance, and that exclusively secular
subjects were taught by only public school teachers.161 These
facts were considered sufficient to demonstrate that the "services
[were] provided in a location that [was] physically and education-
ally separate from the functions of the parochial school, and
[therefore] religiously neutral."162
157 Id. at 246-47.
158 Id. at 247. Here again the facade of neutrality was maintained. The Court re-
quired only a minor alteration in the site of provision of these services rather than re-
quiring the individuals involved to comprehensively change their lives and compromise
their religious beliefs as was required by the appellate division in Grumet.
159 934 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991).
160 Id. at 920; see also Walker v. San Francisco United Sch. Dist., 761 F. Supp. 1463
(N.D. Cal. 1991). While the district court differed with Cavazos in its conclusion as to
whether the mobile units could be located on the property of parochial schools, it did
sustain the constitutionality of providing separate instruction to parochial school children
in religiously neutral locations off parochial school property. It concluded that such a
practice conferred only an incidental benefit to religion and therefore did not have a
primary effect of advancing religion. Id.; cf. Cavazos, 934 F.2d at 923 ("[W]e do not be-
lieve that dictum by Justice O'Connor compels a holding that Chapter 1 services must be
provided in units that are parked off the property of the religious institution.").
161 Cavazos, 934 F.2d at 919-20.
162 Id. at 920.
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Applying these principles to Grumet, it quickly becomes appar-
ent that there is little to distinguish the mobile units described in
Wolman and Cavazos from the Village District created by Chapter
748. The provision of services through the newly created District,
like the provision of services through the use of mobile units, was
a creative and practical attempt to provide much needed remedial
services to students of but one religious denomination in a man-
ner consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Aguilar."6
The Village District, like the mobile units, constitutes a religiously
neutral location within the Village. The District is physically sepa-
rate from the religious schools within the community, is wholly
secular in appearance, follows a secular academic -calendar, and
offers instruction only by public school teachers in exclusively
secular subjects.1 The District buildings, therefore, are indistin-
guishable from a "typical" public school." These factors make it
likely that the students as well as the general public will distin-
guish the crucial difference between government support of reli-
gion and mere government accommodation of religion.1 Thus,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern any real difference be-
tween the District and the mobile units previously upheld by the
Supreme Court.
Moreover, the Wieder court specifically suggested that Monroe-
Woodbury was free to provide remedial services at a "neutral site"
within the Village if it chose to do so, in a manner analogous to,
if not exactly the same as, that involved in Cavazos.16 7 Monroe-
Woodbury would thereby be providing public school teachers to
teach secular subjects at a neutral site to a group of students,
most of whom, if not all, adhere to the same religious precepts.
An objective observer would find it difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish between a neutral site located within the Village ad-
ministered by the Board of Education of Monroe-Woodbury and
the Village District currently administered by the publicly-elected
163 See supm note 24 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
165 See genmlly Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680 (1971) (noting the absence of
these factors as proof of the secular nature of the facilities).
The neutral character of the District does not "confer the imprimatur of state ap-
-proval" on religion which is an important index of symbolic effect. See Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
166 Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 391 (1985).
167 Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d
767, 775 (N.Y. 1988).
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Board of Education of the District."s Accordingly, the mere exis-
tence of the Village District within the confines of a religiously
homogeneous municipality cannot have the impermissible effect of
creating a symbolic link between government and the Hasidic reli-
gion.
(b) The legislative action of creating a public school does not create
an impermissible symbolic link between government and religion.-While
the Grumet trial court initially focused on the symbolic effect aris-
ing from the presence of the District within a religiously homo-
geneous community, the appellate division attacked the legislative
action of creating the District in an attempt to accommodate the
needs and desires of the Satmar.'" The majority felt that this
attempt at accommodation, regardless of the constitutionality of
the District's presence or of the constitutional manner in which it
was operated, created an impermissible symbolic union between
church and state.'
However, if one were to adopt the appellate division's reason-
ing, "it could be argued that any time a government aid program
provides funding to religious organizations in an area in which the
organization also has an interest, an impermissible 'symbolic link'
could be created, no matter whether the aid was to be used solely
for secular purposes."' Such an approach would jeopardize aid
to religiously affiliated hospitals, 7 aid to religiously affiliated col-
leges,173 and aid to religiously affiliated institutions providing
counseling services, 74 all of which have previously been upheld
by the Court. If the Village were viewed as a religious entity, such
168 Brief for the Appellant Monroe-Woodbury at 40, Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992) (No. 1054-90)
(brief for N.Y. Court of Appeals).
169 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Village Joel Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123,
128 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
170 Id
171 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613 (1988) (referring to the district court's
conclusion invalidating the participation of religious organizations in the AFLA grant
program).
172 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (mere fact that hospital was con-
ducted under auspices of Catholic Church was insufficient to alter purely secular charac-
ter of the corporation for purposes of federal aid for construction of new building).
173 See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding provision of
noncategorical grants to religiously affiliated colleges); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734
(1973) (upholding issuance of revenue bonds to religiously affiliated colleges); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding act authorizing construction grants to reli-
giously affiliated colleges).
174 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 613-14.
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an approach would also seem to proscribe the provision of services
such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, and highway
maintenance.' 75 Yet, as the Court noted in Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,176 "Such services, provided in
common to all citizens, are 'so separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function,' . . . that they may fairly
be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture towards religious
institutions"177
Moreover, to conclude that Chapter 748 creates an impermis-
sible symbolic union between government and religion would
require that the District be viewed as more of an endorsement
and create a closer identification with religion, than do Sunday
closing laws, 178  creche displays on city property,179  legislative
prayers, 18°  and release time programs for religious instruc-
tion.' It would stretch reality to conclude that the provision of
wholly secular services, even to a community wiose populous ad-
heres to essentially one religion, creates more of a symbolic union
between government and religion than do these benefits previous-
ly sustained by the Court"'
175 See supra note 136 for a discussion of the different constitutional treatment af-
forded religious communities of private landowners as distinguished from the treatment
afforded religious communities in which all real property is owned and controlled by a
religious organization.
176 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
177 Nquis 413 U.S. at 781-82 (citation omitted) (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (finding bus fare program analogous to other neutrally available servic-
es)); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) (noting that the Court has
never held that freeing private funds for sectarian uses invalidates otherwise secular aid
to religious institutions); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646, 659 (1980) (noting that the Establishment Clause does not proscribe extension
of general benefits to religious groups).
178 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Court noted in Nyquist, that
these laws 'were sustained even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it
somewhat more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even attend
religious services." Nquis4 413 U.S. at 775-76.
179 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (noting that the creche advances
religion in a sense, but that precedent contemplates some such advancement from gov-
ernment action); se also Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
617-20 (1989).
180 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer to begin
each session of Congress).
181 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
182 As the Court noted in Wolman v. Walter, 433-U.S. 229 (1977),
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers
that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of
Rights. The risk of a significant religious denominational control over our demo-
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Thus, the Court has long recognized that government may
accommodate the religious choices of individuals without necessari-
ly running afoul of the Establishment Clause.18 By cooperating
with the expressed desires of the Village residents, the state affir-
matively advances not religion, but rather the values of religious
freedom and tolerance that the Establishment Clause was designed
to protect. Chapter 748 merely accommodates the purely private,
voluntary religious choices of the Village residents and at the same
time provides much needed secular remedial services."' As Chief
Justice Burger noted in dissent in Wallace v. Jafee,"' "If the gov-
ernment may not accommodate religious needs when it does so in
a wholly neutral and noncoercive manner, the 'benevolent
neutrality' that we have long considered the correct constitutional
standard will quickly translate into the 'callous indifference' that
the Court has consistently held the Establishment Clause does not
require. " 186
F. Chapter 748 Does Not Foster Excessive Government
Entanglement with Religion
Determining that Chapter 748 does not establish, sponsor, or
support religion does not end the requisite analysis. The end re-
sult--the effect-also must not excessively entangle government
with religion. While the appellate division intentionally did not
address this third prong of Lemon because it had concluded Chap-
ter 748 already failed the first two prongs,' 7 Judge Kahn of the
New York Supreme Court did address the issue. He concluded
that the New York State Education Department would be required
to take special steps to monitor the new District to ensure that no
public funds were expended to further the religious tenets of the
cratic processes-or even deep political division along religious lines-is remote,
and ... any such risk seems entirely tolerable in light of the continuing over-
sight of this Court.
Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
183 See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
184 What is involved, therefore, is not state action endorsing a particular religion, but
rather "an attempt by the State to accommodate those differences which the existence in
our society of a variety of religious beliefs makes inevitable." Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 317 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
185 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
186 Id. at 90 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
187 Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123,
129-30 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992) ("[W]e see no need to consider the third prong of
the Lemon test.").
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Satmar Hasidic faith, thereby unavoidably entangling government
"in religious matters."a  Therefore, it deserves at least cursory
analysis here.
As Justice Brennan observed in Aguilar v. Felton,89
The principle that the state should not become too closely
entangled with the church in the administration of assistance is
rooted in two concerns. When the state becomes enmeshed
with a given denomination in matters of religious significance,
the freedom of religious belief of those who are not adherents
of that denomination suffers, even when the government pur-
pose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition,
the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is
limited by the government intrusion into sacred matters.' 90
The objective of this third prong, therefore, is to prevent as far as
possible the intrusion of either the church or the state into the
respective sphere of the other, without prescribing hostility.19
1
This necessarily requires close scrutiny of the degree of entangle-
ment involved in any relationship between government and reli-
gion. Determining whether government entanglement is excessive
and thus impermissible has been accomplished by examining three
factors: the character, of the beneficiary aided, the nature of the
aid provided, and the potential for political, divisiveness.192
Most of the cases in which the Court has invalidated pro-
grams under the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test have
involved aid to sectarian schools. Any finding by the Court of
excessive entanglement has rested largely upon the undisputed
fact that the beneficiaries were "pervasively sectarian" schools who
had "'as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious val-
ues.'"
193
188 Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007 (Sup. Ct.), aFd
sub no=m Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123
(App. Div. 3d Dept. 1992).
189 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
190 Id. at 409-10.
191 See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
192 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971); see also Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750-51 (1976).
193 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 411 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973)).
It should be noted that the Court has never held that political divisiveness alone
can serve to invalidate an otherwise constitutional practice. In fact, Justice O'Connor has
suggested that political division along religious lines should not even be a separate test:
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In Lemon, for example, the Court made extensive findings
about the very real potential for excessive entanglement due to
the substantially religious character of the church-related schools
receiving aid.'94 The Court further noted the character of the
aid provided; that the program subsidized teachers, either directly
or indirectly, as the teachers were employed by a religious organi-
zation, subject to the direction and discipline of religious authori-
ties, and taught within facilities dedicated to the inculcation of
particular religious tenets. 95 The Court concluded that greater
governmental surveillance would be required to guarantee that the
aid would not result in subsidizing religious instruction. Such pro-
phylactic contacts involved excessive and impermissible government
entanglement with religion. 96
In Meek v. Pittenger,'97 the Court made similar findings. In
striking down a Pennsylvania program which provided professional
staff and materials to sectarian schools, the Court concluded that
"[t]he prophylactic contacts required to ensure that teachers play
a strictly nonideological role . . .necessarily give rise to a constitu-
tionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and
state." 9 ' While supervision may very well have ensured that the
teachers did not advance the religious mission of the school, the
'Court observed that it would nonetheless result in unconstitutional
administrative entanglement."m
However, not all such programs which provide aid to religious
or religiously affiliated beneficiaries have been struck down for
entanglement concerns by the Court. In Aguilar v. Felton,2" the
Court expressly distinguished three such programs on the basis
that the beneficiaries were not "pervasively sectarian" in charac-
Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Establishment Clause.
Its existence may be evidence that institutional entanglement is excessive or that
a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of religion. But the con-
stitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of the government
activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself. The
entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entan-
glement.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
194 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616-18.
195 Id. at 618.
196 Id. at 619.
197 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
198 Meek, 421 U.S. at 370.
199 1&
200 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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ter.2"' The Court allowed the government aid in these cases due
to the limited extent to which religion permeated the character of
the beneficiary. Finding that religious indoctrination was not a
substantial purpose for these schools, as well as noting the non-
ideological character of the aid provided, the Court concluded
that impermissible government entanglement with religion would
not occur.0 2 The necessity for any supervision or inspection was
found to require no more intensive an administration than would
occur had the beneficiary been wholly secular in nature.
20 3
Applying these principles to the facts in Grnment there is no
evidence of any degree of involvement between government and
religion at all, let alone excessive interaction. Rather than being
"pervasively sectarian," the new District is instead a wholly secular
school like any other that can be found across the state.
No religious influences appear, whether it be the character of
the facilities themselves, the nature of the subjects taught therein,
or the individuals providing the instruction. 24 All are completely
devoid of any and all religious overtones. The only monitoring
that must be undertaken requires no more entanglement with
religion than does state inspection of any public school.
Given that the District is operated by a non-Hasidic Superin-
tendent of Schools and a publicly elected Board of Education, and
that the teachers are all state certified and non-Hasidic as well, the
concerns expressed by the Court in Lemon relating to surveillance
of the teachers do not arise. In Lemon, the teachers involved were
directly employed by a religious organization, subject to the direc-
tion and discipline of religious authorities, and taught within a
system whose primary purpose was dedicated to specific religious
indoctrination.0 5 Conversely, the teachers involved in Grumet are
not subject to any such religious controls. In fact, the exact oppo-
201 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 411-12; see Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S 736
(1976) (finding the possibility of occasional audits to ensure the secular use of
noncategorical grants to lack the impermissible effect of entangling government with
religion); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (provision for inspection by state au-
thorities to ensure secular use of state issued revenue bonds did not foster excessive
government entanglement); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (inspections to
ensure secular use of one-time construction grants to sectarian colleges does not foster
excessive government entanglement).
202 See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 750-54; Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746-49; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 685-
88.
203 Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
204 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
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site is true. The teachers are all employed by the State of New
York, are subject only to the direction and discipline of the Super-
intendent of Schools, and provide only secular remedial and auxil-
iary services in an environment dedicated only towards providing
the free public education which the children who attend de-
serve.2" Furthermore, when the Court concluded in Wolman v.
Waltei 7 that the provision of remedial services to parochial
school students at neutral sites did not impermissibly advance
religion, it also noted that,
[n]either w[ould] there be any excessive entanglement arising
from supervision of public employees to insure that they main-
tain a neutral stance. It can hardly be said that the supervision
of public employees performing public functions on public
property creates an excessive entanglement between church
and state.2°
If the surveillance of a mobile unit parked outside a parochial
school to provide secular instruction to exclusively parochial
school students does not rise to the level of excessive government
entanglement with religion, then surely a public school within a
validly incorporated municipality requires no more extensive con-
tact. Cumulatively, therefore, for purposes of determining the
facial validity of Chapter 748, all of these considerations indicate
that any church-state interaction would be far from excessive.
Thus, when analyzed giving proper sensitivity to our traditions
and case law, Chapter 748 must be sustained as constitutional on
its face. It has a valid secular purpose in that it provides much
needed remedial services to the Village's handicapped children
who would otherwise be forced to refuse these entitlements in the
manner previously provided by Monroe-Woodbury. The statute also
does not have a primary effect which either advances or inhibits
religion. It neither provides direct support to religion nor does it
create an impermissible symbolic link between government and
religion. Rather, the District facilities represent a wholly secular
presence within the Village and provide only secular services,
thereby rendering the District virtually indistinguishable from any
other public school in New York. Finally, the supervision of public
employees, on public property, providing secular services cannot
rationally be argued to represent an unconstitutional entanglement
206 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
207 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
208 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248.
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of government with religion. Therefore, Chapter 748 should be
viewed as exactly what it is, a good faith attempt to provide a
practical solution to an otherwise intractable problem through the
permissible accommodation of religion. Requiring anything more
from such "neutrality" between government and religion leads not
to a truly neutral result, but to unnecessary hostility towards reli-
gion.
V. TWO RECENT ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LEMONV-
A TEST FOR THE FUTURE OR MORE OF THE SAME?
Over the past decade, the area of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence has been clouded by a veil of change and uncertainty.
Tests used by the Court have been revised, re-examined, and even
ignored. Moreover, given the recent decision of Lee v. Weisman2°
and the much anticipated decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District, ° it is apparent that this period of uncertainty is
far from complete. In seemingly incremental steps, the Court has
been cautiously shedding the constraints imposed by the much
maligned and periodically ignored Lemon test and moving towards
a more flexible, and hopefully more determinate standard of anal-
ysis. As this process of change continues, every Establishment
Clause challenge provides an opportunity for growth and clarifica-
tion.
Two different approaches appear to be contending for the
opportunity of replacing Lemon. The first of these was presented
by Justice O'Connor in two separate concurring opinions in
Wallace v. Jaffre2 1' and Lynch v. Donnelly.212 The tests enunciat-
ed therein focus upon whether the challenged conduct or legisla-
tion signifies government "endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion." Realistically, however, this approach represents nothing
209 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see also supra note 55.
210 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), eet granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). At issue in Zobrest is
whether public school authorities would violate the Establishment Clause by providing the
services of a sign-language interpreter for a deaf child attending a parochial school. The
district court, as well as a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, granted the school district's
motion for summary judgment. Thus, Zobrest provides the Court with yet another oppor-
tunity to either clarify its Establishment Clause jurisprudence or abandon the Lemon test
entirely.
211 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (striking down an Alabama
statute authorizing a daily peridd of silence in public schools).
212 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (sustaining the inclusion of
a nativity scene in a city's Christmas display).
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more than a modification in the focus of the primary-effect sym-
bolic-union prong of the Lemon test.
The second of these approaches was presented by Justice
Kennedy in two opinions as well, in County of Allegheny v.
ACLLP13 and Lee v. Weisman.2 14 For Justice Kennedy, the critical
element of analysis is whether government has used its power to
"coerce" or "proselytize" religious faith. However, while it repre-
sents movement in the direction of the original understanding of
the Establishment Clause, it falls short of complete adoption of
that approach.
A. O'Connor's Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor's approach attempts to re-examine and re-
fine the Lemon test in an effort to make it more useful and capa-
ble of consistent application. It fundamentally relies upon the
notion that Establishment Clause challenges should be analyzed
with respect to whether an "objective observer" would "perceive"
government action or legislation to "sen[d] a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community."215 Thus, under this approach, Lemon's mod-
ified inquiry requires the courts to determine "whether
government's purpose was to endorse religion and whether the
statute actually conveys a message of endorsement."216
Few government attempts at accommodation of religion which
have been upheld by the Court and which have become part of
our tradition, however, could withstand challenge under an honest
application of this standard. As Justice Kennedy notes in his sepa-
rate opinion in Allegheny, even references to God in such things as
the Pledge of Allegiance, in legislative prayers which begin each
session of Congress, and in the motto which adorns our currency,
all would surely result in making the "reasonable" atheist feel less
than a full member of the community.21 7 Yet such government
acknowledgement and accommodation of religion does not repre-
sent an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 218 Thus, this
213 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(striking down the display of a creche within a county courthouse).
214 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (striking down the recitation of invocations or benedic-
tions at public school graduation ceremonies).
215 Wallac, 472 U.S. at 69, 76.
216 Id. at 69; see ahso note 112.
217 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 671-73.
218 There are numerous other examples of government acknowledgement and accom-
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itandard suffers from many of the same infirmities as the Lemon
test. It too results not in government neutrality towards religion,
but rather in inconsistent line drawing which at times merely con-
ceals what is in fact hostility towards religion.219
B. Kennedy's Coercion Test
Justice Kennedy's approach gives only nominal recognition to
Lemon, and instead focuses on essentially two limiting principles
gleaned from the Court's prior case law, that ,
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to
religion in such a degree that it in fact "establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."2"
However, rather than relying squarely upon the concept of coer-
cion as understood by the Framers, 1 Justice Kennedy expanded
the concept in Lee to include so called "psychological coercion," a
modation of religion which have been upheld by the Court, but which would fail Justice
O'Connor's endorsement'test. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (uphold-
ing grants to nonpublic institutions providing counseling services); Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970) (upholding property tax exemptions for churches); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961) (sustaining Sunday closing laws); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(upholding release time program).
219 As applied to the facts of Grumet, no message of endorsement of the Satmar
Hasidim's religion could rationally be perceived by a truly objective observer. Rather,
what such an observer would in fact notice, is that the District facilities are wholly secu-
lar in appearance, provide only secular instruction in a wholly secular environment, and
comlly fully with all state laws and regulations. See supra notes 35-48. An objective ob-
server would also note the uniquely secular presence which the District represents within
the culture and lifestyle of the Village: where every building is decorated with religious
symbols, contact between men and women is severely restricted, Yiddish is the primary
language spoken, and education focuses upon study of the Torah. Thus, an objective
observer would not fairly regard Chapter 748 as endorsing Hasidic religious principles.
Rather, they would understand that Chapter 748 merely represents a secular attempt at
accommodating the unique cultural and religious needs of the Village residents. For as
Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence in Wallace, "[t]he endorsement test does not
preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking religion into account
in making law and policy." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70.
220 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
221 As Justice Scalia notes in his dissent in Lee, "[the coercion that was the hallmark
of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of finan-
cial support by force of law and threat of penalty." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,
2683 (1992).
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form of coercion which is backed by neither the force of law nor
the threat of penalty.
While Justice Kennedy practically ignores Lemon, illustrating its
essentially terminal existence, the psychological-coercion test also
falls short of representing a wholly workable standard for the fu-
ture. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in Lee, this standard "suffers
the double disability of having no roots whatsoever in our people's
historic practice, and being as infinitely expandable as the reasons
for psychotherapy itself."222 Thus, it too requires the courts to
engage in haphazard line drawing, which would likely result in
many of the same shortcomings as the Lemon test which it is de-
signed to replace. However, it does represent movement in the
right direction, namely towards a workable approach which incor-
porates the standard of coercion which motivated the Framers to
adopt the Establishment Clause in the first place.22 _ It remains
to be seen which approach will ultimately be accepted by a major-
ity of the Court. Cases such as Zobrest and Grumet will likely pro-
vide insight to the answer.
VI. CONCLUSION
If current or future standards require the invalidation of legis-
lation such as Chapter 748, which meets an entirely secular need,
then the crisis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is much
worse than it appears. Grumet convincingly illustrates why the
murky neutrality tests should be abandoned. Not only do they
produce inconsistent results, but their purported neutrality towards
religion in the public square, in reality, leads only to the exclusion
of religiously affiliated people from full participation in public
programs. Thus, their concept of "neutrality," rather than being
truly neutral, instead merely results in masked hostility toward reli-
gion.
The position of religion in society is an important one, a
position buttressed by the diversity of faiths we profess to admire.
To disallow sorely needed remedial assistance to a group of handi-
222 I& at 2685.
223 As applied to the facts in Grunet, there is little if any problem surrounding Chap-
ter 748. The District no more coerces support or participation in religion or its exercise
than does any other public school district within the country. Merely because the influ-
ence of any particular religion may be significant over a majority of the pupils attending
a non-sectarian and public school, created for specifically defined secular purposes and
with learly articulated secular powers, is surely not enough to represent a government
attempt at coercion of religious participation or exercise.
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capped children merely because they choose to live a life of deep
religious conviction is to abandon our celebration of such diversi-
ty. Only by accommodating the provision of public benefits to
their unique cultural and religious needs do we thereby demon-
strate respect for the religious nature of our people and follow
the best of our traditions. We must never lose sight of the fact
that the religion clauses were not written as a protection from
religion, but rather as a protection for religion. The New York
Court of Appeals should take this opportunity to reaffirm these
fundamental principles upon which the Establishment Clause is
based and reverse the decision of the appellate division.
Craig L. Olivo

